hhs.gov DMARC Checker

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DMARC Check for hhs.gov

The DMARC record for hhs.gov is published as a DNS TXT record at _dmarc.hhs.gov. It tells receiving mail servers what to do when an email claiming to be from hhs.gov fails SPF and DKIM authentication checks — whether to deliver it normally, send it to spam, or reject it entirely.

DMARC also provides hhs.gov's administrators with visibility into who is sending email using their domain. Through aggregate reports (rua) and forensic reports (ruf), domain owners can monitor authorized and unauthorized email activity.

This DMARC checker shows hhs.gov's current DMARC policy, alignment settings, and reporting configuration. A well-configured DMARC policy is essential for protecting hhs.gov from email spoofing and phishing attacks.

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What Is DMARC?

DMARC is an email authentication policy layer that sits on top of SPF and DKIM. While SPF verifies the sending server and DKIM verifies the message hasn't been altered, DMARC ties them together by requiring that at least one of these checks "aligns" with the From header domain.

Without DMARC, even if hhs.gov has SPF and DKIM configured, receiving servers have no instruction on what to do when authentication fails. DMARC fills this gap by providing an explicit policy (none, quarantine, or reject) and a feedback mechanism through reporting.

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DMARC Policies Explained

DMARC has three policy levels. "p=none" is monitor-only mode — authentication failures are reported but email is delivered normally. This is the recommended starting point for hhs.gov when first implementing DMARC. "p=quarantine" sends failing emails to the spam/junk folder. "p=reject" blocks them entirely, providing the strongest protection.

The "pct" tag controls what percentage of failing messages the policy applies to, allowing a gradual rollout. For example, hhs.gov could start with "p=reject; pct=10" to reject only 10% of failing messages while monitoring the impact, then gradually increase to 100%.

Most organizations roll out DMARC in phases: start with "p=none" to gather data, analyze reports to identify all legitimate email sources, add them to SPF/DKIM, then move to "p=quarantine" and finally "p=reject". hhs.gov's current policy level reveals where it sits in this rollout.

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DMARC Alignment

DMARC requires that either SPF or DKIM "aligns" with the From header domain. For hhs.gov, this means the SPF-authenticated domain or the DKIM signing domain must match hhs.gov (or a subdomain of hhs.gov in relaxed mode).

Alignment can be "strict" (exact domain match only) or "relaxed" (organizational domain match, allowing subdomains). The "aspf" tag controls SPF alignment and "adkim" controls DKIM alignment. Most domains use relaxed alignment (the default) because it's more flexible while still providing good protection.

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Frequently Asked Questions

Does hhs.gov have DMARC? — The DMARC analysis for hhs.gov shows whether the domain has a published DMARC record at _dmarc.hhs.gov. If no record is found, hhs.gov has not configured a DMARC policy.

What is hhs.gov's DMARC policy? — The policy level (none, quarantine, or reject) is reported in the DMARC analysis. "reject" provides the strongest protection, while "none" is monitoring-only.

Does hhs.gov enforce email authentication? — A DMARC policy of "quarantine" or "reject" indicates that hhs.gov actively enforces email authentication. A policy of "none" means hhs.gov monitors but doesn't enforce.

How do I set up DMARC for my domain? — Start by creating a TXT record at _dmarc.yourdomain.com with the value "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@yourdomain.com". Monitor the reports, then gradually increase enforcement to quarantine and reject.